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Abstract 
 
In the Republic, the link between aletheia and phainesthai is of utmost importance. In different 
passages “truth” is defined by a juxtaposition with a “falsehood” consisting in a deceptive 
appearance of things. Such is the case in 380D (phantazetai), in 382A (phantasma), and 382E 
(phantasia). Phainesthai is therefore a characteristic feature of the dokoumena, that is of objects 
belonging to the lowest level of knowledge (e.g. 479B-480A and 509D-510A). This does not 
entail, however, that phainesthai should be understood as a mere error or deception. Its 
meaning is in fact much wider, and not only a negative one. Plato stresses how the whole 
ascent to the ideas takes place within the phainesthai of the horoumena. Each step undertaken 
by the dialektike techne (starting from ta en hydasi phantasmata and ending up with tou phanotatou 
en horatoi topoi) is related to different ontologic “appearances” of things (532C1 and 7-8). The 
same applies to the soul which hides behind its exterior aspect although being perceivable 
through a blepein (611B-612A): even here, Plato’s disavowal of visibility seems to lead to the 
establishment of another, “superior” kind of “what can be seen”.  
 The visibility arising from the phainesthai of things is therefore both mimetic (concealing 
truth: 596D-601E) and ontologic (showing that very truth: 523B-525B). It is intrinsically 
ambiguous, thus leading to very different ways of approaching it in modern scholarship. The 
literature dealing with mimesis in Plato’s Republic concentrated on the “falsehood” of 
appearance, whereas the scholars interested in the phenomenologic background of Plato’s 
ontology pointed out the “constructive” aspects of that very appearance. The present work 
aims at combining these two approaches, showing their complementarity in Plato’s 
polyvalent use of phainesthai (and of the connected nouns phantasia, phantasma, etc.) in the 
Republic. 
 
 
 
In the Republic, the link between phainesthai and alētheia is of utmost importance. In different 
passages “truth” is defined by a juxtaposition with a “falsehood” consisting in a deceptive 
appearance of things. This does not entail, however, that Plato understands phainesthai as a mere 
error or deception. Its meaning is in fact much wider, and not only a negative one. In some 
passages Plato stresses how the ascent to knowledge can be attained only within “what appears” 
of truth. The visibility arising from the phainesthai of things is therefore both mimetic (concealing 
truth) and ontologic (showing that very truth). Phainesthai in its connection to alētheia is intrinsically 
ambiguous, thus leading to different ways of approaching it in modern scholarship: on one hand 
literature concentrated on its “falsehood”, on the other on its “constructive” features.1 The 
                                                
1 See the influential work by Heidegger 19472, and the criticism on it by Heitsch 1962, Friedländer 19643, and Szaif 
19983, 145-152. A recent overview on alētheia in Plato is provided by Szaif 2009. On the constructive features of 
phainesthai, see most recently Vogt 2012, Smith 2012, Harte 2013, Schwab 2013, and Moss 2014, esp. 221-227. 
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present work aims at combining these two approaches, showing their complementarity in Plato’s 
polyvalent use of phainesthai and the connected term phantasma. 
In the first part of the paper I will dwell on two passages of the Republic featuring the 
deceptive aspects of phainesthai. In the second part, I will focus on a passage which shows how 
the phainesthai of things refers as well to something which can be approached only gradually, 
through its visible albeit unsteady manifestations. It will turn out that such a phainesthai may not 
be “true” from an epistemic viewpoint, but is nevertheless “true” from another viewpoint, that 
of a progressive unveiling of alētheia. In the final part of the paper, I will draw some conclusions 
from these different ways of understanding phainesthai and alētheia, and focus on the reciprocity 
linking these two notions to each other. 
 
1. Phainesthai as deception (378a-383c and 596d-601b)  
 
In a section of Book II dealing with the canons the poets should observe when representing 
myths, Plato focuses on which features the gods may display and which not (378a-383c). Gods 
should always be shown as what they are really like, that is good and responsible for everything 
beneficial; this excludes that they can be represented as evil, or quarrelling with each other. Since 
they are perfect, they should also be portrayed as changeless, incapable of transforming 
themselves, and, most important, as incapable of doing any harm to mankind. Therefore, they 
should not appear in many guises, as this would deceive people making them believe that their 
nature is never the same (380d). 
This passage is crucial, as it shows the connection between appearance, deception, and belief. 
The god appearing in different shapes (phantazesthai: 380d2) is not a god but a sorcerer (goēta: 
380d1). He becomes a deceiver (apatōnta: 380d4) once he makes people believe (poiounta dokein: 
380d4-5) that he is not what he really is, but what he appears to be like, that is unsteady and multi-
shaped. In the subsequent pages (381e-382a) we learn something more about the deceiving 
strategy of the gods. Socrates asks Adeimantus if the gods, though remaining identical to 
themselves, deceive (exapatōntes kai goēteuontes: 381e10) by making it seem (again poiousin dokein: 
381e9) that they appear in different guises. Their “appearing” (phantasma: 382a2) can be direct, 
performed through what they do (ergōi: 382a2); or else it can be indirect, performed through what 
they say (logōi: 382a1).2 In both cases phainesthai conceals truth, and leads to a false belief of what 
gods really are. 
                                                
2  See as well 382e-383a, where the distinction ergōi-logōi is outlined very clearly. It seems sensible to take the 
phantasma of 382a2 with logōi and ergōi, as Adam 1905 I, 121 does (contra Waterfield 1993, Ferrari–Griffith 2000, and 
Vegetti 1998-2007, all of them taking logōi and ergōi with pseudesthai). 
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It is very important to note that in these passages the concealment of truth performed by the 
gods is seen as a productive operation: their deception consists in producing a dokein3 which has 
the scope of substituting reality with appearance. This dokein leads to a deception which is much 
more powerful than that arising from phainesthai, as it implies the involvement of the judicative 
ability of the deceived person. Doxa is in fact a sort of “commitment to truth”, for believing 
something entails believing as well that what one believes is true – even if at the end of the day 
this belief can turn out to be wrong. In other words, doxa is highly deceptive because it is not at 
all conscious of being a doxa.4 It takes a complex paideutic process to understand that doxa is 
only a limited kind of knowledge, which has to be abandoned in favour of a superior one, that of 
epistēmē.5 And even after such a process it is far from easy to distinguish “true” or “correct” doxa 
from epistemic veracity.6 
A kind of deception similar to that performed by the gods occurs at the beginning of Book X, 
where the making of the “mimetic” artist is defined as the reproduction of things not how they 
are, but how they appear (phainomena... ou onta tēi alētheiai: 596e4; cf. 596a10, 598a5 and b3-4). Such 
a reproduction is faint in comparison to truth (amydron ti... pros alētheian: 597a10-11; cf. 598b3-4), 
as well as to the objects it represents, the phainomena. For this reason, the works of the mimetic 
art par excellence, that is poetry, are downgraded by Plato to a third ontologic level, that of 
phantasmata (599a2).7 These phantasmata are deceptive illusions in an ambiguous sense: in spite of 
being appearances of appearances, pale reflections of what they stand for,8 they turn out to be so 
realistic that they manage to pass themselves off as what they represent. 
As in the passage of Book II we saw before, the deception induced by the phainesthai leads 
also here to a dokein (601a-b), to a belief which is not conscious of its own epistemic limits. What 
we learn more about this dokein is that its power relies on fascination (kelēsin: 601b1). Such a 
fascination is unavoidable, since it depends on the deceptive nature (physei) of poetry itself, on 
the “colours of its music”, i.e. the names and the verbs which can be seducing irrespectively of what 
                                                
3 As Plato shows extensively at the end of Book V (476a-480a), every knowledge based on perception, that is on the 
appearance of things, leads to doxa, to a belief which is juxtaposed to the steady knowledge arising from aperceptual 
epistēmē. For a thoughtful account of the relation between phainesthai and doxa/doxazein in this passage see Szaif 
19983, 110-124. 
4 See Wieland 19992, 284-285. 
5 On the distinction doxa-epistēmē see Cross–Woozley 1964, 166-195; Ebert 1974, 105-132; Annas 1981, 190-216; 
Lafrance 1981, 117-151; Horn 1997, Wieland 19992, 280-309; Fine 20002. 
6 See Sprute 1962, 11-14; 57-60; 92-99; Wieland 19992, 304; Szaif 19983, 144. 
7 I refrain from connecting the notion of phantasma in the Republic to that occurring in the Sophist, i.e. at 266c (as 
most scholars do, e.g. Adam 1905 II, 138; Sprute 1962, 48; Untersteiner 1966, 119 and Halliwell 1988, 118). The 
reason for this choice will become clear in the conclusion of my paper. 
8 On this issue see extensively Halliwell 2002 and Palumbo 2008. 
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they represent. Hence the extreme danger of this art, which can make people believe potentially 
anything.9 And hence also the necessity to banish it from the ideal city. 
This passage is very interesting, since Plato provides here a hierarchy of mimēsis from the 
viewpoint of phainesthai: at first place (1) we have reality, of which art can represent only the 
appearance; at second place (2) we have the representation of that very appearance; at third place 
(3) we have, in addition to that very representation, the enchantment caused by the media of 
poetry. The sense of this tripartition becomes clear when Socrates invites Glaucon to look how 
words would appear “once stripped of the colours of music and spoken by themselves” (601b3-
4). This specification is important, because it shows that Socrates does not reject mimēsis 
altogether, but aims at establishing a moderate kind of it, i.e. an artistic phainesthai free of magic 
enchantment (=2). In this particular case phainesthai has therefore a positive function, being a 
means able to unveil the deception of the magic devices characterizing mimetic poetry. 
 
2. Phainesthai as the unveiling of alētheia (510a-532c) 
  
This positive aspect of phainesthai leads us to the second part of my paper, which is devoted to 
phainesthai as a manifestation of alētheia. The passage I will examine is one of the most discussed 
of the whole Republic, as it stretches along the famous allegories of the line and the cave featured 
in Books VI and VII. Here Plato dwells extensively on the route leading from the unsteady and 
imperfect knowledge of the visible arising from perception to the firm knowledge of the idea of 
the Good, which can be grasped only through intellectual effort. As we will see, each step 
undertaken during this journey is linked to phainesthai, that is to a progressive unveiling, of 
alētheia. This graduality of phainesthai entails that alētheia can be experienced only at subsequent 
levels, each of them getting closer to its complete manifestation. To indicate the progressive 
nature of this ascending process, Plato uses both the comparative (alēthestera: 515d) and the 
superlative (alēthestaton: 484c9. Cf. Phaed. 65e) of the adjective alēthes: things can be “true”, “truer” 
or “truest” depending on the amount of alētheia they unveil.10 
The first step directing towards alētheia occurs at 501a, where Plato introduces the analogy of 
the line in order to explain the difference between the realm of what can be seen and that of 
what cannot be seen. Here, in the second section of the part of the line hosting the visible things, 
we find a term we already met before, that of phantasmata. These “appearances” reflect in the 
                                                
9 Scholars as Untersteiner (1966, 130) claim that in these passages of the Republic Plato is criticising Gorgias. In fact, 
not only the noun kelēsis (601b1), but also the occurrences goētēs, apataō, exapataō and goēteuō sawn in the passage of 
Book II (380d1, 380d4, 381e10) can be found in the texts of the Sicilian sophist, thus suggesting that Plato is 
referring to a conception which is characteristic for Gorgian aesthetics. 
10 See Sprute 1962, 75-77. 
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water (en hydasi) everything which can be perceived through the eyes, and are therefore the first 
things telling mankind that something different from what can be seen exists. The connection 
between these phantasmata and alētheia becomes evident at 516b-c, where they reflect the sun 
(again en hydasin),11 which is the source of every possible alētheia. Far from being the deceptive 
illusions of the passage we saw in the first part of the paper (599a2), these phantasmata are 
connected to truth in the sense that they reveal all the visible things. As Plato puts it, visibility as 
such owes its origin to a “place which appears through the sight” (di’ hopseōs phainomenēn hedran: 
517b2). 
But phainesthai unveils not only what is visible. It occurs also within the realm of “what can be 
known and hardly seen” (en tō gnostō... kai mogis horasthai: 517b8-c1), where its function is to make 
appear what would otherwise be inaccessible, that is the idea of Good.12 For on its own this idea 
does not show itself: it can be “seen” only thanks to phainesthai, which unveils it as the cause of 
everything good and right, of the light and the light’s sovereign in the visible realm and of truth 
and reason in the intelligible realm. Plato defines the idea of Good as tou ontos to phanotaton, which 
means as much as “that which appears more than everything that exists” (518c9).13 Here again 
we are faced with a superlative, which in this particular case indicates that once the maximum of 
appearance is reached the object appearing must be necessarily the idea of the Good. This 
coincidence is of utmost importance, as it entails that a full unveiling of the idea of the Good is 
the only possible condition for an epistemic knowledge of what is visible and what invisible, of 
what is an intelligent conduct in private affairs or in public business (517c). 
Opposite to such knowledge is the unsteady and untrustworthy world of doxa. This is not 
“true” as the idea of Good is: it is in fact only a partial appearance of it. Still, it should not be 
rejected completely, as even an imperfect phainesthai can direct towards alētheia, being “the 
offspring of that very Good” (ekgonos te tou agathou: 506e3) – exactly like the fire in the cave is in a 
way the reflection of the sun reigning outside. The same gnoseologic function applies to the 
phantasmata: despite their deceptive character, they are “true” in the sense that they are an 
indispensable means for approaching alētheia. Not by chance Plato calls them “divine” (theia: 
532c1), acknowledging their provenience from the sun as well as their ability “to guide the soul 
until it sees the best part of reality” (532c5-6). 
                                                
11 This en hydasi has a markedly propedeutic character, as is evident also in 516a and 532c1: looking at ideas “how 
they really are” is possible only after having been prepared to do so by looking at the “appearances” of these ideas. 
Such appearances are therefore a necessary means for ascending to alētheia, albeit being themselves only a pale (and 
potentially deceptive) image of that very alētheia. 
12 Socrates is very clear in stating that “the things which appear to me do appear to me as follows: in the realm of 
what can be known [what appears is] uttermost the idea of Good” (ta d’oun emoi phainomena houtō phainetai, en tō gnostō 
teleutaia hē tou agathou idea: 517b8-c1). 
13 See as well 532c7-8: tou phanotatou en tōi sōmatoeidei te kai horatōi topōi. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
The phantasmata occurring in the Republic are very different from those we can find in other 
dialogues of Plato, e.g. in the Sophist. In the passages we examined they certainly bear many 
deceptive aspects, but at the same time they refer to something different, of which they are the 
unveiling appearances. This entails that despite their deceptive character they are “true”, being an 
indispensible manifestation of alētheia. Phantasma and alētheia are closely related to each other, as 
without the first the latter would not become visible at all. The process which leads to 
gnoseologic visibility can however not ground exclusively on the phantasma, as it is alētheia which 
in his turn “activates” the phainesthai of things by shedding light and being on them.14 
Hence the reciprocity of phainesthai and alētheia. What “appears” of alētheia is “true” even if it is 
deceptive from a logical or epistemological viewpoint, as it enables to start a process of 
approximation to alētheia which may eventually lead to a complete unveiling of it. On the other 
hand, what “is true” in phainesthai “appears” despite its deceptive power: it shows itself by 
displaying an ambiguous phantasma which drives away from every-day experience and enhances 
the search for knowledge. 
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